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The idea that internal conﬂicts play a signiﬁcant role in mental health has
been extensively addressed in various psychological traditions, including per-
sonal construct theory. In the context of the latter, several measures of conﬂict
have been operationalized using the Repertory Grid Technique (RGT). All of
them capture the notion that change, although desirable from the viewpoint of
a given set of constructs, becomes undesirable from the perspective of other con-
structs. The goal of this study is to explore the presence of cognitive conﬂicts in
a clinical sample (n = 284) and compare it to a control sample (n = 322).
It is also meant to clarify which among the different types of conﬂict studied
provides a greater clinical value and to investigate its relationship to symptom
severity (SCL-90-R). Of the types of cognitive conﬂict studied, implicative dilem-
mas were the only ones to discriminate between clinical and nonclinical samples.
These dilemmas were found in 34% of the nonclinical sample and in 53% of
the clinical sample. Participants with implicative dilemmas showed higher symp-
tom severity, and those from the clinical sample displayed a higher frequency of
dilemmas than those from the nonclinical sample.
The notion of cognitive conﬂict has a long tradition in psychology.
Different theories address the issue of internal conﬂict, which en-
snares people in hard and sometimes painful internal struggles.
For instance, psychoanalytical theories employ the notion of con-
ﬂict in order to account for psychic states in which contrary in-
ternal demands (or forces) oppose each other within the subject.
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Such conﬂicts can be overt or latent, and in certain cases the latter
can reveal themselves in a different but related manner within the
overt conﬂict and translate into the formation of symptoms, be-
havioral disorders, personality disruptions, and so on (Laplanche
& Pontalis, 1967).
On the other hand, cognitive-social theorists such as Heider
(1946) and Festinger (1957), with their respective theories on
“balance” and “cognitive dissonance,” address the issue of there
being little internal consistency. These theories postulate that
such dissonances generate a motivational tendency to elude or
resolve these contradictory cognitions regarding social reality: “If
no balanced state exists, then forces towards this state will arise.
...If a change is not possible, the state of imbalance will produce
tension” (Heider, 1946, p. 108).
Interestingly, the relevance of conﬂict has also been ad-
dressed by constructivist pioneers. Jean Piaget (e.g., 1974), pro-
posed the term “cognitive conﬂict” for describing the contradic-
tions encountered by a child when attempting to explain certain
events. In this case, such conﬂicts cause a cognitive imbalance and
the child is forced to reorganize his or her intellectual processes
in order to rid him- or herself of the problem; hence the subse-
quent intellectual change.
However, Kelly’s (1955) personal construct theory (PCT)
probably represents the most elaborate framework for an under-
standing of cognitive conﬂict and its relevance for personality and
clinical psychology. Its emphasis on human freedom and choice
allow for a view of human beings facing personal dilemmas. Cer-
tainly, if human beings are not seen with a certain degree of free-
dom and agency, they can hardly have dilemmas. The central no-
tion in Kelly’s PCT is that of personal constructs. These, for him,
are avenues of meaning with two poles. Because of their bipolar
nature, they capture a difference. They also allow for similarity,
when a third element (or more) is added to one of the two poles.
Because the notion of personal construct is based on difference it
allows the possibility of conﬂict.
A constructivist position is necessary to consider conﬂicts oc-
curring in the context of the person’s own constructions.
Over and over again, it appeared that our clients were making their
choices, not in terms of the alternatives we saw open to them, but in termsViewing Cognitive Conﬂicts as Dilemmas 143
of the alternatives they saw open to them. It was their network of construc-
tions that made up the daily mazes that they ran, not the pure realities
that appeared to us to surround them. To try to explain a temper tantrum
or an acute schizophrenic episode in terms of motives only was to miss
the whole point of the client’s system of personal dilemmas. (Kelly, 1969,
p. 84)
Kelly goes on to propose PCT as an alternative view for
Mowrer’s (1950) neurotic paradox, for which it is seen as para-
doxical that human beings persist in behaviors (symptoms) that
make them suffer:
[T]he behavior of a so-called neurotic client does not seem paradoxical to
him until he tries to rationalize it in terms his therapist can understand. It
is when he tries to use his therapist’s construction system that the paradox
appears. Within the client’s own limited system he may be faced with a
dilemma but not with a paradox. (Kelly, 1969, p. 85)
Thus, for Kelly constructions may entail dilemmas (used as
synonymous in the ﬁrst quotation), and by understanding those
dilemmas we can better grasp the nature of the person’s behaviors
and suffering.The fragmentation corollary (Kelly, 1955) provides
an important cue for considering internal conﬂict in the context
of the personal construct system. It suggests that humans are not
logical, nor are their construct systems consistent or fully inte-
grated. This idea has been seminal in understanding both clinical
problems and health from a PCT perspective, as evidenced in the
following section.
Cognitive Conﬂicts in PCT
Since the time of George Kelly, PCT has grown enormously in
theory, research, and practice (see, e.g., Fransella, 2003; Walker
& Winter, 2007). It has also been surrounded by other compat-
ible constructivist approaches (see, e.g., Feixas & Villegas, 2000;
Neimeyer & Mahoney, 1995). However, the notion of cognitive
conﬂict has not become as visible as one would imagine attend-
ing to its theoretical, clinical, and self-apparent relevance. Some
advances have been made, however.
The issue of conﬂict and lack of consistency become cen-
tral for the understanding of clinical problems from a personal144 G. Feixas et al.
construct view. The program of research on schizophrenic
thought disorder led by Bannister (e.g., 1960, 1962; see Adams-
Webber [1979] and Winter [1992] for reviews), although more
focused on the notion of loose construing, somehow also related
to lack of integration. In reviewing this research, Adams-Webber
(1981) gave a central role to excessive fragmentation due to the
absence of superordinate permeable constructs that “under the
pressure of events in a constantly changing environment will tend
to be haphazard rather than systematic, and can lead ultimately to
the collapse of all conceptual structure” (p. 56).
Along these lines, Space and Cromwell (1978) assigned to
conﬂicts in the cognitive system a speciﬁc role in the process
of breakdown and cognitive disorganization. Attempts to reduce
conﬂict may give constructs idiosyncratic meanings so that “loose-
ness and instability occur as the ﬁnal effort for conﬂict resolu-
tion” (p. 188). Space and Cromwell viewed the development of
thought disorder as an adaptive response to reduce internal in-
consistencies that are deeply embedded in the construct system.
Also, Carroll and Carroll (1981) considered that a lack of bal-
ance (consistency between affect and cognition) in interconstruct
relations may result in fragmented and contradictory social per-
ceptions. Thus, they saw balance as an integral aspect of mental
health, as it promotes consistent, differentiated, and stable social
perceptions.
In understanding the development of construct systems,
Adams-Webber (1970) attributed a role to conﬂicts that parallels
that of Piaget. In his works he suggested that new structures evolve
to accommodate events that are ambiguous according to the per-
son’s existing structure.
A given event can be said to be ambiguous when it becomes the focus of ex-
pectations which are inconsistent with one another in terms of the speciﬁc
relationships between constructs which articulate the ‘logical’ structure of
an individual’s system. (Adams-Webber, 1981, p. 55)
Under Kelly’s supervision, Hinkle (1965) coined the term im-
plicative dilemma to refer to a particular form of implication be-
tween two constructs (A-B and X-Y), and related it to the notion
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A and B imply X, and B implies Y; also A implies X and Y, and B implies X
and Y. One subject, for example, when relating desirable-undesirable and
realism-idealism, said that realism and idealism both implied desirable and
undesirable aspects for him. Conﬂict theory and double-bind theory relate
to these implicative dilemmas. (pp. 18–19, emphasis in the original)
As we can see, Hinkle considered the types of implication
between two constructs, regardless of where the self and other
elements were located. In the same work, however, he proposed
the laddering and implication methods on the preferred pole of
a construct for a given subject, which is a way of taking into ac-
count the person’s goals or projects derived from his or her core
structure.
Various personal construct theorists have followed this idea
by pointing to the role of conﬂicts and dilemmas in understand-
ing the construing processes involved in some clinical situations.
Rowe (1971) conceptualized a case of a chronically depressed pa-
tient as embracing a construction whereby his or her choice was
either being depressed and humane or being a destructive and
unpleasant person. In this view, dilemmas occur when both of the
alternatives apparently available within the construct system are
seen as undesirable.
Stemming from Hinkle’s (1965) notion of implicative
dilemma, Tschudi (1977) proposed his ABC model. In it, the A
construct describes the symptom or problem in one pole, and its
positive contrast pole is regarded as a desired goal for the person.
The construct B designates the disadvantages of the symptom on
one pole and the advantages of change in A on the other. Thus,
B provides further information on why the person wants to move
on the A dimension. The “crucial step” (p. 324), however, lies on
construct(s) C. This construct reﬂects the advantages of having
the symptom, or the disadvantages of changing in the A construct.
By exploring both B and C, it becomes clear that a symptom may
have not only negative but positive implications. Certainly, con-
struct C hinders movement, and “ABC is an implicative network
of a special type, an implicative dilemma” (p. 324). In this situa-
tion, “the system is blocked, the person is stuck or “forced to” run
in circles. ...the symptom solves the problem, but the price is felt
to be too high” (Tschudi, 1977, p. 325).
Along this view of conﬂict lies the work of Ryle (1979). His
appreciation for the importance of dilemmas was one of the146 G. Feixas et al.
seeds for his cognitive analytic approach which was developed
later:
Dilemmas can be expressed in the form of “either/or” (false dichotomies
that restrict the range of choice), or of “if/then” (false assumptions of
association that similarly inhibit change). Two common dilemmas could
be expressed as follows: 1) “in relationships I am either close to someone
and feel smothered, or I am cut off and feel lonely”; ...2) “I feel that if I
am masculine then I have to be insensitive.” (Italics in the original)
In his studies with clients with social anxiety, Winter (1988,
1989) found that constructs related to social competence (e.g.,
social, outgoing) carried negative implications (e.g., selﬁsh, in-
considerate, bossy), and the more pronounced these implications
are,themorenegativetheoutcomeinsocial skillstraininggroups.
This type of pattern occurred in 80% of these group clients, which
provides a substantial foundation for an explanatory model of
resistance from a personal construct viewpoint: “The treatment
which these clients were understandably resisting was therefore
one which they appeared to construe as training in selﬁshness,
contempt, and deceit, characteristics which were inconsistent with
their core roles” (Winter, 1989, p. 4).
So, for these clients hypothetical change would generate
guilt—that is, a dislodgement from one’s core role (Kelly, 1955).
Resistance can be explained in this model (Winter, 1989) as a
way of retaining personal coherence in order to avoid massive
invalidation.
Other types of clinical problems have also been related to
conﬂicts in construing. Drysdale (1989) found a greater tendency
to associate having pain with being sensitive in chronic pain
patients as compared to those with acute problems. Cromwell,
Sewell, and Langelle (1996), in their study on traumatic stress and
dissociative processes, suggested:
[W]hen a person is dealing with contradictory construction systems within
self, he or she does not make the typical resolution to revise constructs.
Instead, the dissonance is resolved by creating separate person icons (i.e.,
alternative personalities). Such icons would help remove the awareness of
intrapsychic conﬂict. (p. 190)Viewing Cognitive Conﬂicts as Dilemmas 147
In sum, for these cases where cognitive conﬂicts are found,
the construction system generates two different personal goals
(i.e., becoming social and remaining unselﬁsh and considerate).
But according to the structure (network of implications between
constructs) of the system, these two goals are incompatible within
that system (fragmentation corollary), so that accomplishing one
is incompatible with the other. The conﬂict is “resolved” then
by “choosing” according to the more superordinate of these two
goals, as a way to protect the core of the system from invalida-
tion and the negative emotions (McCoy, 1977) that would follow
it. But this “solution” is obviously unsatisfactory for the sufferance
derived from the symptoms and/or the blockage in the develop-
mental process. Thus, the identiﬁcation of these conﬂicts may be
a crucial step for both personal construct case formulation and
therapy.
The Identiﬁcation of Cognitive Conﬂicts in Repertory Grids
Although conﬂicts and dilemmas have been reported in the liter-
ature following clinical observation and case studies (e.g., Rowe,
1971), several approaches to systematic identiﬁcation have been
proposed. As a way to organize the description of these pro-
posals, we distinguish among triadic conﬂicts (those involving
three constructs or elements), implicative dilemmas (involving
two constructs), and “dilemmatic constructs” (involving only one
construct).
1. Triadic Conﬂicts (TC)
The term triadic conﬂict (TC) is used here to describe a type of
conﬂict that was proposed under the generic name of cognitive
conﬂict. Its origins can be found in Heider’s (1946) cognitive bal-
ance or equilibrium theory in triads. Slade and Sheehan (1979;
see also Sheehan, 1981) applied this idea to the study of personal
constructs among triads to see whether balance or imbalance was
displayed between them in repertory grids. They considered that
a “conﬂict” (for our purposes a TC) existed whenever three con-
structs correlated between each other negatively,1 or when two
correlate positively and the third negatively. Another way to put it
is that a triad of constructs was considered unbalanced when the148 G. Feixas et al.
multiplication of their signs was negative. Thus, these authors pro-
posed that the sign (+/−) of the correlations between constructs
was a central aspect of the criteria to identify these unbalanced
triads.
This measure was further investigated by Winter (1983), who
conveniently detected a problem in Slade and Sheehan’s (1979)
measure. By considering only the signs of the correlations with-
out taking into account the intensity or strength of the correla-
tion trivial inferences can be made, especially in the case of low
correlation coefﬁcients. Certainly, a correlation coefﬁcient of, say,
0.04 is quite indistinguishable of another one of −0.04. At these
low levels of correlation intensity, coefﬁcients may be negative or
positive accidentally.
To exclude these low correlations, Feixas and Cornejo
(1992) established a minimum value of 0.20 for the correlation
coefﬁcient.2 The measure was kept unmodiﬁed in later versions
of their computer program (Feixas & Cornejo, 1996, 2002) and
tested for validity in Feixas, Bach, and Laso’s (2004) study of
construct differentiation. In it, their TC measure showed no sig-
niﬁcant association with other grid variables. Although it distin-
guished between randomly generated grids and human grids,
this measure failed to discriminate between a clinical and a
nonclinical sample.
Also using Heider’s (1946) notion of balance, Carroll and
Carroll (1981) provided a measured of (im)balance in repertory
grids based on Morrissette’s (1958) network model. For that mea-
sure to be computed, in addition to completing the repertory
grids they asked subjects to express how much they liked or dis-
liked each element. Also, they had to assign a positive or negative
valence for each construct pole. Both judgments were made on
an 11-point scale. The additional valuation task included in this
method makes it different from those types of TCs mentioned
above. Theyalso underline thisdifference with respect to the work
of Slade and Sheehan (1979), saying that in the latter method “no
consideration is given to affective relations in personal construct
systems” (Carroll & Carroll, 1981, p. 85). This method has scarcely
been used recently, probably because of its singularity and the fact
of not being available in a computer program.
Another type of triadic conﬂict was proposed by Bell (2004),
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assesses all possible triads formed by two constructs and each
element to identify “conﬂicts/inconsistencies/contradictions”
(p. 54) as deﬁned by these two possible conditions:
1. An element is at the same time similar or close to two con-
structs that are themselves different or distant.
2. An element is similar or close to one construct’s pole and at the
same time is different to or distant from another construct’s
pole, where the two construct poles are similar or close (Bell,
2004, p. 54).
Similarities or differences between constructs and elements
are operationalized as the rating of the element on the construct,
and those among constructs as their Euclidean distances. The
presence of conﬂict is assumed when the longest distance in any
three points (two constructs and one element) does not exceed
the sum of the other two (see Bell [2004] for more details and a
case example).
2. Implicative Dilemmas (ID)
Originated in the context of PCT by Hinkle (1965) and further
reﬁned by others (Feixas & Sa´ ul, 2004; Feixas, Sa´ ul & S´ anchez
Rodr´ ıguez, 2000; Rowe, 1971; Ryle, 1979; Tschudi, 1977; Winter,
1982, 1992), an implicative dilemma (ID) can be regarded as a
particular cognitive structure in which the pole of a construct rep-
resenting a symptom or problem is associated to a positive pole
of another construct, which might be at a higher level in the sys-
tem’s hierarchy. Conversely, change to the opposite (desired) pole
of the symptom construct carries negative implications in terms of
the (presumably) superordinate construct.
The identiﬁcation of dilemmas in repertory grids is
based on ﬁnding unexpected correlations between constructs
(see Winter, 1992). More speciﬁcally, Feixas, Sa´ ul, and S´ anchez
Rodr´ ıguez (2000; see also Feixas & Sa´ ul, 2004) proposed a struc-
tured procedure that lies at the basis of the Multi-Center Dilemma
Project3 (MDP). They deﬁned an implicative dilemma as a cor-
relation between a discrepant and a congruent construct in a
way that the desired change in the former is associated to an
undesired change in the latter. This method, implemented in150 G. Feixas et al.
the GRIDCOR v. 4.0 (Feixas & Cornejo, 2002) grid analysis pro-
gram, is based on the distinction between these two types of
constructs: discrepant constructs (e.g., “timid–social”) reﬂect a lack
of satisfaction for the self as located at the pole representing
the symptom or problem and viewing the ideal self represented
by the opposite pole. On the contrary, congruent constructs (e.g.,
“modest–arrogant”) represent a construct where self and ideal self
concur (e.g., both on “modest”). Thus, the subject doesn’t view
any need for change in this construct.
The divergence between self and ideal self in the discrepant
construct calls for a change (e.g., becoming “social”) that appears
to be meaningful for the system because it is based on the subject’s
own appreciation. However, the dilemma occurs when change in
this construct is linked to an undesired change in a congruent
construct (e.g., becoming “arrogant”). By virtue of this associa-
tion, change is at the same time meaningful for the discrepant
construct and meaningless for the congruent one. This contradic-
tion reﬂects that the system has generated diverging, incompati-
ble goals (e.g., being “social” and “modest”), a phenomenon that
could be associated to fragmentation. To put it in other terms,
a movement of the self to the opposite pole of the discrepant
construct (symptom cessation) would result in validation. But, be-
cause this construct is connected by an implication line with a con-
gruent construct, that change would result in invalidation. There-
fore, we consider the situation as dilemmatic because remaining
in the undesired pole (e.g., being “timid”) is at the same time
validating and invalidating. Equally, the perspective of change is
viewed as providing both validation and invalidation. In this situ-
ation, following the choice corollary, we can infer that the system
“chooses” the present (problematic) position for the self as a way
to prevent the congruent construct from invalidation. This no-
tion of implicative dilemma (see Feixas & Sa´ ul [2005] for a case
illustration), and its operative deﬁnition in the grid, reﬂects the
tradition of PCT in explaining the clinical phenomena called
“neurotic paradox” and “resistance.”
3. Dilemmatic Constructs (DC)
A dilemmatic construct is that which does not offer the subject
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expressed by the fundamental postulate, is to anticipate events.
Kelly (1955) also stated that “the person builds his life upon
one or another of the alternatives represented in each of the di-
chotomies. This is to say he places relative value upon the ends of
his dichotomies” (p. 65). One way to appreciate this value in grids
is by the way the “ideal self” element is scored. Usually, the person
values one of the poles of one construct as appropriate for this
“ideal self,” thus expressing his or her preferred pole, and also a
sort of goal for him- or herself. With certain constructs, however,
both construct poles are deemed undesirable by the subject, and
a middle-point rating is given to the “ideal self.” Therefore, such
constructs are ambivalent, each pole offering both advantages and
disadvantages, and neither offering a clear-cut choice. For exam-
ple, in the construct “talkative–reserved” a woman rates 4 (on a
7-point Likert scale) for her ideal self. This score means that she
does not wish to be neither “talkative” nor “reserved.” Both of the
options may involve advantages and disadvantages. For her, being
“talkative” might be useful in facilitating the ease of social interac-
tions, but it may also carry the implication of being “superﬁcial” or
“tedious.” Feixas and Sa´ ul (2004) suggested that these constructs
could be considered tentatively as dilemmatic—that is, deserving
further conjoint investigation with the subject. Also they can be
computed as a grid variable to ascertain the level of conﬂict in
grids:
If many dilemmatic constructs appear in a subject’s grid, it means we can
hypothesize that he or she has not developed meaningful constructions
which are viable or useful to him or her. This condition may manifest itself
in feelings of insecurity, hesitation or lack of action. The person may not
know in which direction to go, but rather he or she may know where to
avoid going, and may consequently adopt an uncertain or reluctant atti-
tude towards actions involved with those constructs. (p. 73)
As reﬂected in this section, the notion of cognitive conﬂict
emerges as a matter for research in the area of grid studies with
a variety of measures. However, no comparative study has been
done to clarify which measures have a higher potential to capture
these conﬂicts. Once this is established, grounds are set for fur-
ther validity and reliability studies, and for the inclusion of the
best measure of conﬂict in future grid studies.152 G. Feixas et al.
Objectives of the Study4
We want to compare the three types of cognitive conﬂicts in terms
of their capacity to discriminate between clinical and nonclini-
cal subjects. This study is limited to the two measures of conﬂict
provided by the GRIDCOR v. 4.0 program (TC and ID) and to
the criteria used in it to derive them. In addition, it includes DC,
which is derived from direct grid scores. Subsequently, those mea-
sures showing signiﬁcant differences between the two samples will
be studied in terms of their correlation with psychopathological
symptoms in order to explore the association of these cognitive
conﬂicts with the level of mental health.
Method
Participants
This study includes two different samples with a total of 606 sub-
jects. The ﬁrst group consists of 322 participants (53% of the
total), from now on “the nonclinical sample” (volunteers evalu-
ated by trained psychology students). The second, with 284 par-
ticipants (47% of the total), is the clinical sample (persons who
attend a clinic in order to receive psychotherapy).
Gender is not equally distributed in both samples. In
the nonclinical sample, no signiﬁcant difference exists in the
male/female ratio (44% and 56%, respectively). However, there is
a noticeable difference in the clinical sample (27% male and 73%
female). Indeed, this uneven proportion in the clinical sample
reﬂects what is usually found in clinical psychotherapy services,
wherein the majority of attendants are women (Caro, 2001).5
Concerning the age of the participants who make up the two
samples, the average for the nonclinical sample is 27.66 years
(SD = 8.92), and the average for the clinical sample is 30.89
(SD = 9.38). As these two samples are not comparable in terms of
either sex or age, these variables are controlled in the data analysis
process.
With respect to the type of diagnosis in the clinical sample,
the most common are anxiety (29%), eating (29%), and mood
disorders (19%). These three diagnoses represent over 76% of theViewing Cognitive Conﬂicts as Dilemmas 153
diagnosed clinical sample. Other diagnoses for the participants in
the clinical sample are adjustment, somatomorphic, sexual, and
sex-identity disorders, along with a group of conditions the DSM-
IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) labels as “other con-
ditions that may be a focus of clinical attention,” including occu-
pational, marital, parent–child, academic, and identity problems.
Instruments and Measures
Repertory Grid Technique (RGT): Probably the most used and
best = known assessment tool in PCT (see Feixas & Cornejo, 2002;
Fransella, Bell, & Bannister, 2003; Jankowicz, 2003), the RGT is
more of a method than an instrument. As such, it can be adapted
to assess a variety of constructions with respect to a wide array of
situations or elements. In our case, the type of grid used in the
MDP has a focus on interpersonal issues. Then, the grids should
have a minimum of 10 elements (to ensure that interconstruct
correlations derived from it are based on at least 10 scores) and
go up to about 20, thus varying across subjects to adapt to their in-
terpersonal situations. In all cases the grid includes the “self now”
and the “ideal self,” and usually also “father,” “mother,” broth-
ers and sisters (if any, but not more than three), partner (and
previous partners), male and female friends, and a “persona non
grata.”
Constructs are elicited by comparing pairs of elements, or
dyads, using both similarity and difference methods for each
dyad. Thus, from each dyad several constructs can be obtained.
Not all possible dyads are presented to the subject for elicitation:
Usually, the “father–mother” dyad is the ﬁrst one, followed by
the “self–father” and “self–mother” dyads. Then dyads among
siblings, partners, friends, and the persona non grata are formed,
so that all elements are included in at least one dyad. Except for
those obtained in the ﬁrst dyad, elicited constructs are checked
for repetition with the ones obtained previously. The elicitation
process ﬁnishes when too much repetition occurs, when no
further constructs are created, or “whenever interviewer and
subject consensually felt no more new constructs would appear
(what has been called the ‘saturation point’)” (Feixas, Bach, &
Laso, 2004, p. 300). Therefore, each subject may elicit a different
number of constructs (an average of 16,53 for the nonclinical154 G. Feixas et al.
sample and 15,17 for the clinical one). Elements are rated on
these constructs on a 7-point Likert-type scale for which 1 refers
to the left or emerging pole, 7 the right pole, and 4 the middle
point.
Of all the indices and measures that can be obtained through
the RGT, only those relating to cognitive conﬂicts have been used
in this study.
Triadic conﬂicts are determined by the imbalance in a
triad of constructs. The proponents of this measure (Slade &
Sheehan, 1979) identify a TC whenever three constructs corre-
late negatively, or when two correlate positively and the third
negatively. As a criterion of association between two constructs,
however, Feixas and Cornejo (1996; see also Feixas, Bach & Laso,
2004) established a cut-off point with a minimum magnitude of
0.20 in the Pearson’s product momentum correlations among
them as a more astringent criterion.6 Two measures can then be
derived from this type of conﬂict. The ﬁrst, presence/absence of
TC, is categorical with two values: presence of at least one triadic
conﬂict and complete absence of triadic conﬂicts.
We call the second measure the index of triadic conﬂicts (ITC).
This index was ﬁrst used by Feixas and Cornejo (1996) and in-
dicates the scale of triadic conﬂict that exists in a grid as re-
garding the number of possible triads based on the number of
constructs. It is calculated by dividing the number of conﬂicts
found in the grid by the total number of possible triads of con-
ﬂict. It is a quantitative variable that ranges from 0 to 1, although
its values are usually very low, as the number of possible tri-
ads of constructs (the possible combinations of constructs taken
three at a time) is very large. For that reason it is multiplied by
100.
ITC =
no. of triadic conﬂicts
no. of posible triads
× 100
In the context of the RGT, Feixas, Sa´ ul, and S´ anchez
Rodr´ ıguez (2000) deﬁned implicative dilemmas as an association be-
tween a discrepant construct and a congruent construct, whereby
that which the subject wishes to change in the discrepant con-
struct (changing the “self now” element toward the opposite pole,
where the “ideal self” is located) is associated with the undesiredViewing Cognitive Conﬂicts as Dilemmas 155
pole of the congruent construct. The authors provided as a crite-
rion for such a relationship between these constructs a minimum
correlation coefﬁcient of 0.35.7
A construct is classiﬁed as discrepant when the ratings to the
element “self now” and the element “ideal self” differ, with a differ-
ence equal to or greater than 4 points. In the 7-point scale used,
this difference warrants that these two elements were scored at
opposite poles for that construct. Conversely, a congruent con-
struct is identiﬁed whenever the scores given to the element “self
now” and the element “ideal self” coincide, or when there is
no more than 1 point of difference. Cases in which either ele-
ment is at the middle point (scored as 4) are excluded from this
classiﬁcation.
The presence (or absence) of implicative dilemmas in the
subject’s grid constitutes the ﬁrst measure, dichotomous in na-
ture, involving this type of cognitive conﬂict. The value of pres-
ence is deﬁned by the identiﬁcation of at least one implicative
dilemma. The second measure, quantitative in nature, is the per-
centage of implicative dilemmas (PID), which reﬂects the number of
implicative dilemmas in a grid, taking into account its size. Ob-
viously, the number of constructs elicited during administration
inﬂuences the possible number of implicative dilemmas found,
so a correction is applied for the PID. This measure is calculated
by dividing the number of dilemmas that appear in a given grid
by the total number of possible combinations of constructs of that
grid taken two at a time. In order to ﬁnd the percentage, the pro-
portion of implicative dilemmas obtained from this operation is
multiplied by 100.
PID =
ID
(n!/2[(n − 2)!])
× 100
ID: number of implicative dilemmas identiﬁed in a grid
n: number of constructs in a grid
As stated earlier, dilemmatic constructs are those in which the
subject places the element “ideal self” at a middle point between
both poles of a construct—that is, those who score it with a 4 (on
the 7-point scale that we use for the RGT). The presence of a DC
is a dichotomous variable and reﬂects the presence of at least one
DC or the complete absence of those constructs in the subject’s156 G. Feixas et al.
grid. As with the previous types of conﬂict, its quantitative aspect
is also taken into account by the proportion of dilemmatic constructs
(PDC). This variable informs us as to the proportion of dilem-
matic constructs displayed in relation to all the constructs con-
tained in the grid that the subject has completed. The PDC in-
dex is obtained by dividing the number of dilemmatic constructs
among the total number of constructs in the grid.
PDC =
no. of DCs
no. of constructs
Symptom Checklist-90-Revised (SCL-90-R) (Derogatis, 1977,
1983): This is a clinical inventory aimed at evaluating the num-
ber and level of psychopathological symptoms. It encompasses 90
items that reﬂect nine primary symptom dimensions believed to
underlie suffering in the domain of mental health—Somatization,
Obsessive-Compulsive, Interpersonal Sensitivity, Depression, Anxiety, Hos-
tility, Phobic Anxiety, Paranoid Ideation, and Psychoticism—and three
General Indices of disorders—Global Severity Index (GSI), the
Positive Symptom Distress Index (PSDI), and the Positive Symptom
Total (PST). Of these three general indices, the GSI was se-
lected for this study, as it is the most sensitive indicator of
the level of discomfort suffered by the subject, combining in-
formation on the number of symptoms and the intensity of
discomfort.
The GSI is a generalized, indiscriminate measure of the in-
tensity of overall psychic and psychosomatic suffering. This gen-
eral index of the SCL-90-R is the coefﬁcient of the division of the
sum of all the values assigned to the items (which range from 0 =
nothing at all to 4 = very much or extreme) by the total number
of items in the questionnaire, which is 90. Thus, the value of the
global index ranges from 0 to 4.
GSI =

of all the items
90
Procedure
The data from the clinical sample were gathered from various
psychotherapy services, both public and private, cooperating inViewing Cognitive Conﬂicts as Dilemmas 157
the context of the MDP: Universitat de Barcelona, Universidad
de Salamanca, Barnet, Enﬁeld and Haringey Mental Heath Trust
(UK), Universidad Aut´ onoma de Madrid, Hospital Universitario
la Paz, Universidad Nacional de Educaci´ on a Distancia, and pri-
vate psychotherapy clinics. The RGT and the SCL-90-R were com-
pleted as part of the pretherapy assessment. The only criterion
for exclusion was a diagnosis of schizophrenia or mental retarda-
tion. The nonclinical sample was recruited by psychology students
(both undergraduate and graduate) from their natural environ-
ments (friends, class mates, parents, relatives, etc.) after a mini-
mum of 8 hours training on the RGT.
Repertory grid data was analyzed using GRIDCOR program
version 4.08 in order to obtain indicators of cognitive conﬂicts in
the participants. These indices, along with GSI data and sociode-
mographic variables, were progressively entered into the database
of the MDP and subsequently analyzed using the SPSS 11.5
program.
The statistical tests used in this study mainly include those
that determine the dependency or differences between groups,
such as chi-squared or the student’s t-test. Logistic regression is
used to estimate the inﬂuence of age and sex on the previously
found effects. For rejection of null hypotheses, the conﬁdence
level is set at 95%.
Results
In this section, incidence levels are shown for each conﬂict type
by samples, with the results from the comparative statistical anal-
yses performed. Next, and only for participants with each type of
conﬂict, comparative results for the quantitative conﬂict indices
(ITC, PID, PDC) in the two samples are shown. Such indices are
even more reliable as frequency indicators than the raw frequency
of cognitive conﬂict, as they do not depend on the size of the grid
applied.
After having established which type of conﬂict displays the
strongest differences between clinical and nonclinical samples,
the relationship between that type of cognitive conﬂict and the
level of symptom severity (GSI) will be explored.158 G. Feixas et al.
Triadic Conﬂicts
TC appeared in a 40.70% of the grids of subjects of the nonclinical
sample, and in a 39.10% in the clinical sample. The comparative
statistical analysis produced a statistic χ2
(1) = 0.19 (p = 0.665),
whereby it cannot be afﬁrmed that the presence of TCs is related
to the type of sample.
By taking into account only those participants presenting
with TCs, similar results for the ITC measure in both samples were
obtained: 0.61 (SD = 0.69, n = 131) for the nonclinical sample,
a n d0 . 6 4( SD = 0.61, n = 111) for the clinical sample. The stu-
dent’s t-test, with a contrast statistic t(240) =− 0.37 (p = 0.709),
revealed that such differences are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Implicative Dilemmas
IDs were found in a third of the nonclinical sample (33.90%),
and in over half of the clinical sample (52.10%). In the compar-
ative statistical analysis of the two samples, a χ2
(1) = 20.61 (p =
0.000) was obtained, indicating a signiﬁcantly greater presence of
implicative dilemmas in the clinical sample than in the nonclini-
cal sample.
Among the participants presenting with dilemmas, and from
all the possible combinations that can be established between the
constructs that make up their grids, 2.11% (SD = 2.01, n = 109) of
these combinations (PID) in the nonclinical sample coincide with
what has been deﬁned as an ID. In the clinical sample, the PID
amounts to 4.01% (SD = 3.74, n = 148). By applying a student’s
t-test for independent samples, a t(235.669) =− 5.23 (p = 0.000) was
obtained, indicating that the differences between the clinical and
the nonclinical sample are statistically signiﬁcant in terms of the
PID. The clinical sample showed a greater number of IDs than the
nonclinical sample.
Dilemmatic Constructs
DCs were present in 66.10% of the nonclinical sample, and in
73.20% of the clinical sample. The comparative statistical analysis
produced the statistic χ2
(1) = 3.58 (p = 0.059), indicating thatViewing Cognitive Conﬂicts as Dilemmas 159
the incidence of dilemmatic constructs is unrelated to the type of
sample.
Among participants presenting with DC, the mean PDC for
the nonclinical sample was 0.19 (SD = 0.12, n = 213), whereas in
the clinical sample it was 0.17 (SD = 0.11, n = 208). The student’s
t-test produced a nonsigniﬁcant value of t(419) = 1.57 (p = 0.117).
Up to this point we have studied which of the three types of
conﬂict (TC, ID, and DC) differentiated between the clinical and
the nonclinical samples, with the result that the only type of con-
ﬂict that clearly did so was ID. In order to explore the relationship
between ID and clinical problems in greater depth, and to assess
the possible inﬂuence the variables of gender and age may have
on this relationship, we performed a logistic regression analysis.
The sample (clinical or nonclinical) was taken as the depen-
dent variable. Predictive variables were age, gender, the presence
of IDs, and the interaction between these three variables. The vari-
able selection method used in this logistic regression was the for-
ward Wald method, and the analysis was completed in four steps.
The percentage of cases correctly classiﬁed was 64%, affording
the model an adequate goodness of ﬁt to the data based on the
Hosmer and Lemeshow test (χ2
(6) = 10.15, p = 0.119). On the
other hand, the proportion of variance in the dependent variable
explained by the model was 14% (Nagelkerke’s R2 = 0.14).
In the model produced by this regression analysis, the ﬁrst
variable to enter was the presence (or absence) of IDs, and the
following variables were added in consecutive steps (in this or-
der): gnder, the interaction of age and gender, and the interac-
tion between the presence of dilemmas and age, which was on
the verge of signiﬁcance (the Wald statistic was 3.81, with 1 df ,
p = 0.051). For this reason, it was decided to consider only the
ﬁrst three steps of the model, having observed that the ﬁnal step
added only 0.8% of predictive power, and the adjustment to the
model in Step 3 is greater than that of Step 4, taking into account
the Hosmer and Lemshow test (a value χ2
(4) = 3.31 (p = 0.508)
in Step 3 as opposed to a value χ2
(6) = 10.15 (p = 0.119) in Step 4.
Thus, by taking these ﬁrst three steps, power and parsimony were
increased. The explanatory model correctly classiﬁes 64% of the
cases (76% of the cases from the nonclinical sample and 50% of
the clinical sample). This model suggests that the probability of
belonging to the clinical sample is increased in participants with160 G. Feixas et al.
IDs and in women. Besides, but only among women, this proba-
bility decreases with age.
Looking at the correlations among the quantitative measures
( I T C ,P I D ,P D C )o fe a c ht y p eo fc o n ﬂ i c tm i g h tp r o v i d es o m ei n -
formation about their relationships. To avoid skewed distributions
(with more than half of the subjects with a 0 value), the sample
used to compute these correlations was composed only by the sub-
jects who had at least one of each of the three types of dilemmas
(n = 88 from the total sample of the study). The only signiﬁ-
cant correlation was between ITC and PID (r = 0.43, p = 0.01),
whereas the other two were close to zero.
Relationship Between IDs and Symptom Severity (GSI)
Symptom measures (GSI of the SCL-90-R) were available for only
204 of the subjects of our study. Of these, 156 pertain to the non-
clinical sample and 48 pertain to the clinical sample. The former
present an average in the GSI of 0.44 (SD = 0.22), and the latter
of 1.10 (SD = 0.55). These differences are statistically signiﬁcant
(t(51.571) = 8.24; p = 0.00). As expected, the clinical sample pre-
sented a higher level of symptoms.
For participants with IDs, an average score in the GSI of 0.69
(SD = 0.45; n = 84) was obtained, whereas for the remainder
it was of 0.52 (SD = 0.40; n = 120), and the difference was sig-
niﬁcant (t(202) =− 2.86; p = 0.005). Thus, the participants with
IDs presented higher levels of symptom severity than participants
without such dilemmas. Finally, considering only those partici-
pants presenting with IDs, a signiﬁcant correlation was found be-
tween the PID and the GSI measures (r = 0.34; p = 0.01; n =
84). Correlations with GSI were likewise computed for ITC (r =
−0.08) and PDC (−0.09) but were nearly zero.
Discussion
The data obtained from this study do not appear to confer any
clear role for TCs or DCs in relation to mental health. However,
they do reveal differences between the clinical and nonclinical
samples in regard to IDs. The clinical sample displays a greaterViewing Cognitive Conﬂicts as Dilemmas 161
presence of IDs as compared to the nonclinical sample. Neverthe-
less, it can also be assumed that IDs are common among the gen-
eral population. Actually, up to a third of the nonclinical sample
presents IDs, but they are found in just over half of the partici-
pants in the clinical sample. These results may be considered as
consistent with Kelly’s (1955) reasoning:
[T]he failure of the construct system to embrace urgent events may ac-
company one’s use of incompatible subsystems of constructs. Most of us
can tolerate some amount of incompatibility. Our Fragmentation Corol-
lary assumes that one may successively employ a variety of construction
subsystems which are inferentially incompatible with each other. The Mod-
ulation Corollary ... assumes that the variation in a person’s construc-
tion system is limited by the permeability of the constructs within whose
range of convenience the variants lie. Taken together, these two corollar-
ies assume that one can tolerate some incompatibility but not too much.
(p. 496)
The role of IDs is also reinforced by the discovery that, not
only is it more likely for participants with IDs to belong to the
clinical sample, they also have more of them, as can be seen
from the signiﬁcant difference in the PID. However, the acute
typical deviations found in both samples mean that this statement
should be taken cautiously. Indeed, even the fact of presenting
with many IDs may not be a decisive factor for differentiating
between clinical and nonclinical participants. Obviously, psycho-
logical problems are not only due to having dilemmas. From
our understanding, the presence of IDs is not an indicator of
pathology, although it appears to play a relevant role in mental
health.
The fact that the logistic regression analysis predicted only
50% of the subjects of the clinical sample suggests that while the
issue of IDs, along with gender and age, may have a role to play in
mental health, it does not provide an exhaustive explanation as to
what distinguishes one sample from another. To do so, obviously,
additional predictive variables need to be considered. This is also
corroborated by the proportion of variance of the dependent vari-
able explained by the model, which was only 14%. However, such
a level of variation could be deemed acceptable if we take into
account that the analysis included only three variables and their
corresponding interactions.162 G. Feixas et al.
At this point, it is important to consider that the reason
for applying this logistic regression analysis was not simply to
establish a model oriented to identify participants who could
or could not be regarded as patients, but rather to establish
whether the variables included—in this case gender, age, and
their interactions—inﬂuence the relationship found earlier
between the presence of IDs and the type of sample. The
main outcome of this regression analysis is that the inﬂuence
of IDs on mental health is not merely due to gender and
age.
As expected, and consistent with previous ﬁndings, the clin-
ical sample obtained signiﬁcantly higher scores in the GSI.9 Par-
ticipants presenting with IDs displayed higher levels of symptom
severity, measured with the GSI of the SCL-90-R. Also, the higher
the proportion of IDs found in their grids, the greater their symp-
tom severity. These data further support the relationship between
IDs and mental health.
Interestingly, these results conﬁrm our clinical observations
in many respects. To focus on just one of those, we had used TC
for more than a decade but, despite its theoretical interest and
appeal, we found substantial difﬁculties regarding the use of this
notion. To begin with, it was difﬁcult for therapists in training to
understand a given conﬂict found in a patient’s grid among three
constructs by considering the six poles involved in the conﬂict.
Worse, only a few times did we succeed at explaining such a con-
ﬂict to a patient in a way that was understandable to her or him
or made it relevant to her or his problems. Therefore, its use for
therapy was limited. In contrast, after formulating the notion of
ID in operative grid terms, it has been helping trainees for the
last 7 years to understand the notion of fragmentation, conﬂict,
and resistance from a constructivist perspective. Further, it has
proven useful in clinical practice for case formulation and, more
important, for designing therapy (see Feixas & Sa´ ul, 2005; Fernan-
des, 2007). Usually, clients understand the IDs formulated from
the grid analysis, ﬁnd them useful for understanding their prob-
lems, and are amenable to working on the direction of resolving
them.
The clinical observations made with respect to DCs, however,
have not been conﬁrmed by this study. It might well be that some
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not reﬂect cognitive conﬂict as it was predicted from our under-
standing of constructs and their role on self-regulation in the con-
text of PCT. Still at this theoretical level, the issue of middle-point
ratings on the “ideal self” (and maybe in the “self now”) is open
to discussion, criticism, and further elaboration. More systematic
observation is needed to formulate a hypothesis about the role
of DCs in mental health, maybe related to some speciﬁc clinical
conditions. Consequently, further studies are needed to test these
hypotheses.
A substantial caution must be made with respect to the results
of this study. The three conﬂicts under test are deﬁned according
to operational criteria (i.e., the threshold of 0.20 for TC and that
of 0.35 for ID) deﬁned in previous published works and included
in the GRIDCOR program (Feixas & Cornejo, 2002). The results
obtained might vary substantially with different criteria. Moreover,
in neither the GRIDCOR manual nor the published studies using
these measures (e.g., Feixas, Cipriano, & Varlotta, 2007; Feixas
&S a ´ ul, 2004) can a solid justiﬁcation be found for the precise
thresholds used. Although they might seem appreciatively ade-
quate, more research should be done on their justiﬁcation or, al-
ternatively, on providing other, more accurate thresholds. Also, as
with many other grid studies, the conﬂict deﬁnitions and results
of our study are tied to the particular grid design applied. Varia-
tions in terms of the type of constructs and elements, the rating
scale, and method of elicitation require further reﬁnement and
exploration.
Obviously, the present study must be considered only as a lim-
ited opening step in what should become a much larger research
program in the context of the MDP. Several studies should follow
this one with a wide variety of speciﬁc clinical conditions. This
would allow us to determine whether IDs have a general effect
on all types of problems or only on some conditions. For those
conditions showing an effect for IDs, a further exploration of the
dilemmas found could be pursued using the classiﬁcation system
for personal constructs (CSPC; Feixas, Geldschl¨ ager, & Neimeyer,
2002). This might allow us to identify prototypic types of dilem-
mas for each disorder (as Winter [1988] did with people with so-
cial anxiety). Also, it could be tested whether, following our clin-
ical observations, congruent constructs are coded as moral more
frequently than other constructs. Finally, following an initial step164 G. Feixas et al.
already taken (Feixas & Sa´ ul, 2005), therapy manuals or proto-
cols could be designed to work with dilemmas in speciﬁc clinical
populations.
Conclusions
Of the three types of cognitive conﬂict examined in this study, ID
is the only one that discriminates between our clinical and non-
clinical samples. Effectively, there seems to be a relationship be-
tween the presence of IDs and the fact of pertaining to the clinical
sample. This relationship is not due to gender and age variations
in the two samples. However, the mere presence of IDs is not an
indicator of psychopathology. We found this type of cognitive con-
ﬂicts in over half of the clinical sample and around a third of the
nonclinical sample. Moreover, among the participants presenting
with IDs, those from the clinical sample show a greater number of
IDs in their grids.
In terms of symptom severity, participants presenting with IDs
display the highest levels of severity. Furthermore, the number of
IDs found in the grids of these subjects also appears to be related
to the level of symptom severity.
This study has found that the type of cognitive conﬂict de-
ﬁned by Feixas, Saul, and S´ anchez Rodr´ ıguez (2000) as ID may
be relevant in the understanding of mental health problems.
This result warrants conducting further studies with speciﬁc, well-
deﬁned, different clinical samples to investigate its differential ef-
fect. It also points to the interest of including therapeutic work
with IDs in future treatment protocols developed for those clin-
ical populations in whom a high prevalence of such conﬂicts is
found.
Despite the long tradition of clinical thinking that links inter-
nal conﬂicts to mental health, this study appears to be among the
few that considers various types of cognitive conﬂicts (while ad-
mittedly there might be other forms) with a deﬁned procedure to
measure them, and shows the relevance of one of them (IDs) with
respect to mental health problems. This might allow for a series
of further developments, both for clinical case conceptualization
and for treatment, which may apply to a wide variety of clinical
conditions.Viewing Cognitive Conﬂicts as Dilemmas 165
Notes
1. An example of a TC of this kind, provided by Feixas and Cornejo (2002),
consists of the following three negatively correlated constructs: “up in the air
vs. is aware of problems,” “balanced vs. has outbursts,” and “pessimistic vs.
optimistic.” This conﬂict can be expressed as follows: People who are “up in
the air” are neither “balanced” nor “pessimistic.” However, balanced people
are not pessimistic, either. Taking the opposite poles into account, this could
be interpreted as: To be balanced and aware of problems involves not be-
ing optimistic, although being optimistic is simultaneously related to being
balanced!
2. Another solution to this problem was provided by Bassler, Krauthauser, and
Hoffmann (1992), who developed the Correlation Test program in cooper-
ation with a software company: “This program evaluates signs as well as the
magnitudes of correlation coefﬁcients, in that the two greatest correlations
are brought into a proportional relation by multiplying them. The result is
equivalent to the proportion of variance jointly accounted for by these two
variables. The minimum value for the third correlation is then determined
in that it has to account for the same amount of variance in this now three-
dimensional, jointly occupied space” (p. 99). More details on this algorithm
and the program, as well as an illustrative case study, are also provided in their
article.
Later, Krauthauser, Bassler, and Potratz (1994) provided some validity data
with respect to other grid measures. The number of balanced triads detected
by their program was affected by the number of constructs and elements,
and “extreme percentages of unbalanced triads always coincide with a quite
monolithic cognitive system” (p. 293). Also, they found very low test–retest re-
liability for their measure. One of their theoretical conclusions is that “conﬂict
is not necessarily the proper term for the processes described by this method
of triadic comparisons of correlation coefﬁcients. There are contradictions in
the construct system, but they do not have to be considered conﬂicts” (p. 292;
italics in the original).
3. Information and overview about this collaborative research project can be
accessed at www.usal.es/tcp.
4. This study is part of the doctoral dissertation of Luis ´ Angel Sa´ ul at the Univer-
sidad de Salamanca (July, 2005), where it won the award as best dissertation
of the year.
5. Most of the participants who make up the clinical sample come from
university-based psychological care services. For instance, the activity report
(2000–2001) for services at Salamanca University (UAPSMU) shows that be-
tween 1996 and 2000, women represented 80% of service users, with just 20%
being men.
6. No justiﬁcation is provided by authors with respect to the 0.20 criteria besides
this being a more restrictive criterion than taking just the sign of the correla-
tion. Nevertheless, we used the same criterion because this was the program
used for grid analysis, and because there is published data in the literature
(Feixas, Bach, & Laso, 2004) with this criterion.166 G. Feixas et al.
7. The only rationale provided by the authors for the use of this criterion was
that it excludes low correlations as indicators for an ID. Again, we used this
criterion because the program used was GRIDCOR, and because there are
other studies using the same criterion (e.g., Feixas & Sa´ ul, 2004; Feixas,
Cipriano, & Varlotta, 2007).
8. This program, available in Spanish with the name RECORD, was developed by
Feixas and Cornejo (2002) in order to conduct a statistical analysis of the data
matrix obtained by applying the RGT, and to provide the implicit structure of
the data both quickly and clearly. A full RGT manual and a limited-use version
of this program can be found at www.terapiacognitiva.net/record/gridcor-
3.htm.
9. Checking the GSI scores obtained in both groups with respect to the Spanish
norms, we found that, whereas the nonclinical sample bears quite comparable
levels to those of the norms, the clinical group scores below the psychiatric
samples. This suggests the participants in the clinical group of this study were
not showing high levels of symptoms. Therefore, further studies with more
severe or acute samples are required.
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